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Abstract 
In the European Union (EU) accession process the EU tries to transfer EU rules to the 
candidate states through conditionality. The acquis legislation and laws are not hard to 
implement and therefore almost all candidate states did comply with this part of the acquis. 
However, there is a second element of the acquis, the democratic conditionality, concerning 
the fundamental political principles of the EU, the norms of human rights and liberal 
democracy. According to the EU one of those fundamental political principles is the need to 
curb corruption. In what way is the EU capable of influencing the anti-corruption policy of 
the candidate states? Is the EU thereby affecting corruption in the candidate states? 
In this thesis the role of the EU on the candidate states’ anti-corruption policy is tested. Is 
there any relation between the role of the EU, compliance of the member states and the real 
level of corruption? Statistical analysis and five short case studies show that there is a 
difference between simple rules, laws on corruption on the one hand and perceived corruption 
in a state on the other. The two are not related per se and therefore the EU influence in 
fundamentally curbing corruption is limited. The only way corruption can be stopped is when 
EU efforts are back upped by national actors.   
Keywords:  
Acquis communautaire, membership probability, compliance, conditionality democracy, 
enlargement, European Union, EU, candidate states 
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Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is one of the most influential institutions in contemporary politics. 
Formally established in 1993, the EU now consists of 27 member states. Two major EU 
enlargements took place after the establishing of the Union. One major enlargement was the 
accession of ten countries in 2004: Malta, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland and Lithuania. The second enlargement consisted of the accession 
of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. In regards to future enlargements, Croatia will join the 
Union on 1 July 2013. Macedonia, Iceland, Serbia, Turkey and Montenegro are officially 
candidate member states; these countries will most likely join in the upcoming years 
(European Union 2013).  
When the EU was created a set of criteria was put into place that future member states 
needed to pass before they could join the Union. These are the so-called Copenhagen criteria. 
These criteria demand countries that are willing to join to have stable institutions guaranteeing 
democracy and the rule of law; a functioning market economy and the ability to effectively 
implement the obligations of membership (European Council 1993). However, these criteria 
are not clear on how to understand or how to reach for example these stable institutions or 
such a functioning market economy.  
One issue that is particularly stressed by the EU in the recent decade is the fight 
against corruption (Szarek-Mason 2010, 86). Until 1997 fighting corruption was not part of 
the Copenhagen criteria and hence was no membership condition. In the ‘90s the EU 
addressed corruption more seriously and since 1997 it started to consider the fight against 
corruption as a membership condition for candidate countries (Bulletin of the European Union 
1997, 20). According to Szarek-Mason, there are two main reasons for the European 
Commission to include the anti-corruption policy in the accession process (2010, 144-145). 
The first reason is that the Commission saw corruption as potentially undermining the 
Copenhagen criteria. The Commission believed corruption to be a major problem especially 
with regards to the threat to a free market in candidate member countries. The second reason 
for the inclusion of fighting corruption into the accession policy of the EU was the fact that 
the 2004 enlargement created a situation in which the Union could specify how they would 
like to see stable institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law. In 2004 and in 
2007, the conditionality went far beyond what it was meant to be when it was created in 1993 
(Szarek-Mason 2010, 145).   
“Corruption is the biggest single threat to democracy in Europe today. More and more 
people on our continent are losing faith in the rule of law” (Jagland 2013). The damaging 
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nature of corruption on democracy is a huge threat for the EU (Szarek-Mason 2010, 19). As 
Jagland (Secretary General of the Council of Europe) pointed out in his 2013 January speech, 
people of the EU are losing their faith in the rule of law. Corruption is thus undermining the 
credibility of the EU and of the EU member states and governments (Jagland 2013).  
The latest special Eurobarometer shows that corruption is problematic and is indeed 
undermining democratic functions of the state. Corruption still is a huge issue within the EU 
and most citizens believe corruption is rampant (Eurobarometer 2012). 
Academic research has been done on the subject of corruption as well as on the subject of 
(EU) conditionality. This thesis aims to look at both phenomena. It is obvious that the EU 
sees corruption as a threat to candidate states’ democracy, the rule of law and a market 
economy. It is also clear that the EU wants candidate countries to rule out, or at least lower, 
corruption. This is done through conditionality.  Different countries joined the EU since 1993 
and different levels and types of corruption were present in these former candidate states. In 
this thesis I will assess the extent to which the EU anti-corruption policy decreased the levels 
of corruption in the 2004 and 2007 candidate countries and in Croatia (acceding) Turkey, 
Macedonia and Montenegro (current candidate countries). In this thesis I will build upon the 
theory of the External Incentives model developed by Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, and 
elaborated on by Böhmelt and Freyburg. The research question in this thesis is: 
 
To what extent does the EU anti-corruption policy of the EU accession process 
reduce corruption in candidate states? 
 
In line with Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier and with Böhmelt and Freyburg, I will argue 
that corruption policy compliance is high in candidate states in times of a high membership 
probability (EU membership is certain). The second argument made in this thesis is that anti-
corruption policy and real levels of corruption are not related, that is compliance to EU rules 
on corruption does not necessarily equal curbing corruption. In order to answer my research 
question I will use a mixed methods research design. Firstly, I will use statistical analyses to 
test all former 2004 and 2007 candidate countries and Croatia, Turkey, Macedonia and 
Montenegro with regard to the broad effects of EU anti-corruption policy on levels of 
corruption. Secondly, I will conduct five case studies to fully understand the causal 
mechanisms linking anti-corruption policy with corruption. 
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Literature Review 
What are the known effects of corruption? 
Much of the classic academic literature on corruption sees corruption as beneficial for 
political development, especially for Third World countries (Selgison 2002, 408). Respected 
academics like Huntington and Nye conclude that corruption might be functional to a political 
system. Huntington argues that the extent of corruption correlates with (rapid) social and 
economic modernization (Huntington 1968, 59). He also thinks that corruption “provides 
immediate, specific, and concrete benefits to groups which might otherwise be thoroughly 
alienated from society” (Huntington 1968, 64).  Nye also believes there is a certain way in 
which corruption can be beneficial for political development in less developed countries. 
Some kinds of corruption might promote economic development, national integration and 
governmental capacity (Nye 2002, 284-287).  However, Nye concludes that the costs of 
corruption are more likely to exceed its benefits in less developed countries. In line with this 
conclusion, since the ‘90s, all academics agree on the fact that corruption is considered a 
threat to the consolidation of less developed countries. Corruption is not only economically 
harmful but is also politically damaging.  
The first type of harm is related to economic prosperity and growth. Rose-Ackerman 
concludes that corruption undermines democratic legitimacy but that it also harms the 
prospects for growth (2002, 369).  Selgison mentions the consensus among academics that 
corruption has negative economic consequences (2002, 410) too. For example, empirical 
studies show that when corruption increases in a certain country, investments decrease. These 
studies also show that when corruption increases, the gross domestic product (GDP) decreases 
as well. Next to that, when there are high levels of corruption, business tends to go 
underground to avoid government interference (Seligson 2002, 410). Mauro discusses the 
economic consequences of corruption as well. He mentions the following consequences of 
corruption: it may be interpreted to act as a tax for entrepreneurs; it lowers investment and 
economic growth; the allocation of talent will be worse; it might reduce the effectiveness of 
aid flows; it may cause a loss of tax revenue; it may lead to adverse budgetary consequences; 
it may lower the quality of public infrastructure and services and it may affect government 
expenditures (Mauro 2002, 342-343).   
The second major harming result of corruption is the undermining effect it has on 
democratic principles, for example accountability, equality and openness. Anderson and 
Tverdova examine whether and how corruption affects (citizens’) attitudes towards their 
government (2003, 92). They believe that corruption causes people to have less faith in the 
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democratic process (Anderson and Tverdova 2009, 91). They find that citizens in countries 
with high levels of corruption have indeed more negative evaluations on their government 
than citizens in countries that are cleaner (Anderson and Tverdova 2003, 101). Their research 
also empirically demonstrates that corruption negatively influences system legitimacy, even in 
countries which are cultural dissimilar. Therefore, they argue that their results are 
generalizable across a wide range of countries (Anderson and Tverdova 2003, 104).  
Seligson’s research also shows a relation between corruption and political legitimacy. His 
empirical results make clear that corruption erodes the legitimacy of the political system 
(Seligson 2002, 430).  
 
What causes/affects corruption? 
The current most influential work on causes of corruption is by Treisman (2000). In his cross-
national study he tests fourteen hypotheses. These hypotheses are all defined as indicators of 
corruption and are derived from previous academic work in political science and economics 
(Treisman 2000, 407). The following indicators are tested by Treisman: colonial heritage, 
legal system, religious tradition, ethnic division, raw materials and rents, economic 
development, federal structure, democracy, openness to trade, government wages, political 
instability, state intervention (2000, 418-437). According to Treisman, five factors are 
significant: states with religious traditions (Protestant) tend to be less corrupt, states with 
histories of British rule and more developed economies are less corrupt, while federal states 
are more corrupt. Another indicator for lower corruption is the exposure to democracy (2000, 
399). Three factors were robustly significant. Countries that were more economically 
developed and those which are former British colonies were rated less corrupt. Those which 
have a federal structure were more corrupt (Treisman 2000, 415).  
Another important study that widens Treisman’s research is done by Pellegrini and 
Gerlagh (2008). They actually use a larger data sample, but they test for the same (and more) 
factors influencing levels of corruption. In contrast to Treisman, Pellegrini and Gerlagh find  
that a common law system or a history of British rule are not related to corruption (2008, 
260). However, they do find support that precedence of Protestants, economic development, 
long exposure to (uninterrupted) democracy, diffusion of newspapers and government 
expenditure are related to corruption (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2008, 260-261).  Their general 
argument is that there is support for the cultural theories of causes of corruption and that there 
is no support for the theories based on historical characteristics (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2008, 
260).   
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The European Union anti-corruption policy 
The EU started to combat corruption seriously in the late ‘90s. The EU divided its policy into 
corruption in private- and corruption in the public sector. One of the main elements of the EU 
policy on fighting corruption is a Council Framework Decision (Council Framework Decision 
2003). This Framework Decision aims to criminalize both active- and passive bribery 
(Commission 2011b, 8). In this Framework, bribery is defined as “promising, offering or 
giving a bribe to a person / requesting or receiving a bribe, or the promise of such”.  
The current existing anti-corruption package came into place in July 2006 and 
encompasses (Commission 2011a):  
1. A Communication on fighting corruption in the EU, which presents the objectives of the 
EU anti-corruption report and the practical aspects of its functioning. The Communication 
also explains how the EU should place greater emphasis on corruption in all relevant 
internal and external policies; 
2. A Commission Decision establishing this EU anti-corruption reporting mechanism; 
3. A Report on the implementation of Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA on 
combating corruption in the private sector;  
4. A Report on the modalities of EU participation in the Council of Europe Group of States 
against Corruption (GRECO).  
 
The first element of the anti-corruption package is a communication by the European 
Commission to all other relevant EU bodies (the Parliament, the Council et cetera). This 
communication introduces the EU anti-corruption report and elaborates on how this report 
will operate (Commission 2011b, 4). The second element of the present anti-corruption 
package is the actual Decision establishing this anti-corruption report. The third element is a 
2011 report on the implementation of the 2003 Framework Decision. Finally, the fourth 
element is a recommendation by the European Commission to the European Council. In this 
report the Commission concludes that participation in GRECO is highly recommended 
because of the need for a comprehensive EU policy (Commission 2011d, 9).  
Unfortunately, this present anti-corruption package seems not to be sufficient. “The 
implementation of the anti-corruption legal framework remains uneven among EU Member 
states and unsatisfactory overall. The EU anti-corruption legislation is not transposed in all 
member states. Some countries have not ratified the most important international anti-
corruption instruments. More importantly, even where anti-corruption institutions and 
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legislation are in place its enforcement is often insufficient in practice” (Commission 2011b). 
For example, one of the most striking conclusions in the report on the implementation of 
Council Framework Decision is that only nine EU member states correctly transposed all of 
the offences involving active and passive corruption in 2011 (Commission 2011c, 2). 
Through the annual Regular Reports it is possible to list the legislative and 
institutional arrangements that the European Commission considered important for a national 
policy against corruption. These include the existence of political commitment to fight 
corruption, anti-corruption bodies and codes of conduct. Besides, the strengthening of a legal 
and institutional framework in the fight against corruption, anti-corruption preventive 
measures and mechanisms for closer cooperation between bodies and public awareness 
(Szarek-Mason 2010, 193-194). How the accession process is related to corruption in 
candidate states is elaborated on in the following theory section of this thesis. However, in 
previous academic work, research has been done in the relation between pressure by the EU 
and anti-corruption legislative activities. This relation is shown in figure 1. It shows that the 
accession process was an important incentive for candidate states to fight corruption. The 
conditionality increased anti-corruption legislative activities in candidate states. The question 
I am trying to answer in this thesis is if the compliance to European rules (regarding anti-
corruption measures) is indeed reducing corruption.  
  
Figure 1. Anti-corruption legislative activities and the pull of the EU 
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Theory 
In this thesis I argue that variation in corruption might be a function of compliance with EU 
rules. Hence, in this thesis a phenomenon called EU policy compliance is presumed. A 
benchmark in the literature on EU policy compliance is the study by Frank Schimmelfenning 
and Ulrich Sedelmeier, the so-called External Incentives Model elaborated in their article 
“Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe”. Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier try to grasp in what way rule transfer 
from the EU to Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEECs) is the most effective.  
The EU follows a strategy in which the EU sets it rules as conditions that member 
states have to fulfill in order to receive EU rewards. EU rewards in this sense are considered 
to range from simple trade agreements to full membership (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 
2004, 671). The main assumption of the External Incentives Model is that actors are 
considered to be rational and utility-maximizing in the bargaining process. The model is 
based on a rational-choice approach and thus considers actors to be power and welfare 
maximizers (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2004, 671). When the target government 
complies with the conditions, the EU pays the reward and when the target government does 
not, it withholds the reward (Schimmelfenning et al. 2003, 496-7). This EU strategy is called 
a strategy of reinforcement by reward. The most general proposition of the external incentives 
model is therefore that a state adopts EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the 
domestic adoption costs. This cost-benefit balance depends on the determinacy of conditions, 
the size and speed of rewards, the credibility of threats and promises and the size of adoption 
costs (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2004, 672). 
According to Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, EU external governance follows a 
strategy of conditionality. There are two kinds of rewards: assistance and institutional ties. 
These rewards are ranging from trade agreements or financial assistance to membership 
(Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2004, 671). One specific part of the External Incentives 
Model is tested in this thesis: the size and speed of rewards. Böhmelt and Freyburg (2012) 
have specifically investigated this element of the model. They look particularly at the effect of 
membership probability on compliance to EU policies. They look at membership probability 
in particular because “even in politically costly areas such as the Schengen rules or 
democratic reforms, a highly credible membership perspective is said to ‘have been 
instrumental in overcoming domestic obstacles’, thus decisive in enabling effective EU rule 
transfer in many cases” (Böhmelt and Freyburg 2012, 2). They find that the leverage of 
conditionality varies over the accession process (Böhmelt and Freyburg 2012, 18). When 
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testing their models, Böhmelt and Freyburg find that probability of EU accession is a strong 
and statistically significant predictor of a country’s degree of compliance with EU regulations 
(Böhmelt and Freyburg 2012, 14). Hence membership probability is a very important factor in 
the effectiveness of EU conditionality.  The research by Böhmelt and Freyburg offers 
important empirical support for the External Incentive Model. Their research also suggests 
that compliance effectiveness is highly and mostly related to the temporal dimension of 
conditionality (2012, 18).  The External Incentives Model explains that candidate states have 
strong incentives to comply to EU policies when membership probability is low. These 
incentives decrease when probability is getting more likely along the way of the accession 
process.  
In this thesis I will test the theory on membership probability by Böhmelt and 
Freyburg and I will test if EU membership probabilities can also explain variation in levels of 
corruption in EU candidate states. Next to the variables explaining variation in levels of 
corruption tested by Pellegrini and Gerlagh,  I expect variation of corruption to be a function 
of compliance with EU rules. Therefore, my hypothesis is: 
 
H: the higher the membership probabilities of candidate states, the lower the levels of 
corruption in these states. 
 
Research Design 
In this thesis I make use of the mixed methods approach. This combining of both quantitative 
and qualitative data will counterbalance each methods strengths and weaknesses (Pearce 
2012, 841). Through qualitative research a limited number of cases can be studied in more 
detail and it is a way to explore why and how certain phenomena occur. Weaknesses of 
qualitative research however are the amount of time it takes to collect data and the difficulties 
to produce generalizable results. Through quantitative research already constructed theories 
can be tested and validated, findings can be easily generalized and it takes less time. 
Weaknesses of quantitative research are missing certain phenomena because of the so-called 
confirmation bias and the data might be too abstract and general for application to specific 
cases or countries (Johnson, 2-3).    
In this thesis words, pictures and narrative are used to add meaning to numbers. The 
rationale for using the mixed methods approach therefore is complementary. The qualitative 
data is used to elaborate, enhance and illustrate the results of the quantitative research 
(Johnson, 9).   
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First, I conduct a statistical analysis (regression analysis) in which I examine the 
dependent variable and all explanatory variables for all sixteen countries that joined the Union 
in 2004 and 2007, as well as Croatia. The statistical analysis draws out that there is no general 
correlation between EU membership probabilities and variation in levels of corruption in all 
sample states. Second, I conduct five case studies on corruption and anti-corruption policy. 
They encompass Bulgaria, Poland, Latvia, the Czech Republic and Croatia. This sample is 
based on difference in levels of corruption before and after the accession process. For these 
five countries I examine in greater detail the causal mechanisms to their anti-corruption 
measures and their relation to real levels of corruption.   
 
Concepts, variables and indicators 
In this section I will elaborate on the main concepts, variables and indicators that are used in 
this thesis.  
 
Corruption 
Corruption is a difficult concept to define. Most problems in defining corruption are present 
because there is variation among “corruption” as it is defined in official laws, as it affects the 
public and as it is defined by public opinion (Gardiner 2002, 25). The most quoted and used 
definition of corruption in social sciences is by J.S. Nye: “corruption is behavior which 
deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (family, close 
private clique), pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types 
of private-regarding influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery (…); nepotism (…) 
and misappropriation (…)”  (Gardiner 2002, 26).  
The EU, the central institution in this thesis, defines corruption very broadly. They see 
corruption as the “abuse of power for private gain”, including both private and public sector. 
The EU did however make a distinction between a criminal law definition and the broader 
concept of corruption that is used for the prevention of corruption. The criminal law definition 
is specific and strict because this definition is used to prosecute offenders (Szarek-Mason 
2010, 8). The EU’s criminal law definition, part of the current EU anti-corruption policy, is 
composed around the concept of bribery. The most important element of the current anti-
corruption policy is the earlier mentioned Council Framework Decision (European Council 
2003). This Framework Decision aims to criminalize both active- and passive bribery 
(European Commission 2011, 8). For the purpose of prevention of corruption the 
aforementioned definition is used (“abuse of power for private gain”). Transparency 
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International, an important non-governmental organization (NGO) fighting corruption, also 
uses an almost similar definition: “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” 
(Transparency International 2013). Because of the focus on candidate member states and on 
the anti-corruption policy of the EU, in this thesis I also define corruption as “the abuse of 
power for private gain”. 
Hard evidence of corruption is intrinsically difficult to obtain, because of the secrecy 
surrounding illegal deals but there are several ways to obtain proxies of the extent of 
corruption (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2008, 246). According to Szarek-Mason, the incidence of 
corruption can be measured in three basic ways: by number of prosecutions, perception or 
experience (2012, 12). Each way has its shortcomings, for example measuring prosecutions 
rather explores the effectiveness of the judicial system than the level of corruption in a certain 
state.  Since corruption mostly involves hidden and illegal activities, perceptions are often the 
most reliable information there is (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2006). There is however 
no way to measure corruption with 100 percent reliability, no matter what method is used. In 
this thesis the most reliable measurement of corruption is used: perceptions of corruption.  
In this thesis the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International is used 
as an indicator to obtain levels of perceived corruption in various countries. The reason for 
choosing this index is because it is the currently most used index with regard to perceived 
corruption. Another reason for using this index is mentioned in a study by Paul Wilhelm. 
Wilhelm shows that the Corruption Perceptions Index has the largest validity of all measures 
which measure corruption (2002, 1). Its strength is based on the concept that a combination of 
data sources, solidly combined into a single index, increases the reliability of each individual 
country score (Lambsdorff 2008). The Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency 
International scores countries on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). To make 
a year-to-year comparison, scores rather than rankings are used. Transparency International 
uses a definition of corruption which is in line with the EU definition of corruption “the 
misuse of public power for private benefit” (Transparency International 2013). 
 
Accession negotiations 
The main independent variable that is tested in this thesis is (EU) membership probability. 
Böhmelt and Freyburg consider the accession talks between the EU and candidate countries as 
a “series of negotiations. . . over the extent to which the applicant, at any given stage of its 
preparation, satisfies the conditions set by the Union and the extent to which the Union is 
willing to continue supporting the applicant’s candidacy” (2012, 5). Within this accession 
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process a few stages can be distinguished. The accession process will start with an application 
(1), then there will be the recognition as a candidate state by the EU (2), next the negotiations 
will open (3), thereafter the negotiations will officially close (4) and finally the accession 
treaty is signed (5). “This probability grows over the process of pre-accession as the 
credibility of the EU’s of promises continuously increases and the credibility of threats 
decreases” (Böhmelt and Freyburg 2012, 5). 
In their study, Böhmelt and Freyburg code every stage of the accession process.  They 
allocate countries that do not have a candidate status a 0. Hence, in view of the uncertainty of 
accession, candidates have a real and strong incentive to comply with EU law in order to 
secure membership (Böhmelt and Freyburg 2012, 6).  When a country is recognized as a 
candidate, probability becomes 0.25. When negotiations start, probability grows to 0.5. When 
negotiations start at the same time as the recognition as a candidate state, the probability starts 
at 0.5.  The probability increases to 0.75 when accession negotiations officially ended, which 
generally occurs one year before the actually signing of the accession treaty.  Finally, the 
membership probability increases to 1 as soon as the signing is observed (Böhmelt and 
Freyburg 2012, 11). A probability of 1 is not however not necessarily equal to full EU 
compliance. It simply means that the treaty of accession is signed. Hence, the incentives to 
comply with EU rules are low because membership status is (practically) secured (Böhmelt 
and Freyburg 2012, 6).  
 
Alternative variables/explanatory variables 
In this thesis I test for alternative variables that might impact levels of corruption. Based on 
the arguments provided in the literature review section I use the variables provided by 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh. Pellegrini and Gerlagh derived their variables from Treisman (2000). 
These include religious tradition, economic development, democracy, newspaper circulation 
and government expenditure (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2008, 260-261). Because the research by 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh is more recent and extensive than the research done by Treisman, their 
significant variables are the variables I use in this thesis. Pellegrini and Gerlagh did test all the 
empirical literature there was available on factors influencing corruption and came up with 
these variables after running several cross-country econometric models.  
Although this thesis is mainly about testing the dependent variables for probability, 
compliance is included as an independent variable as well because it might be possible that 
the conclusions by Böhmelt and Freyburg are not in line with this thesis’ findings. One 
assumption of this thesis is that overall compliance to EU rules and membership probability 
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are related. To make sure this assumption is right, I will also test for the relation between 
compliance and probability. The compliance data is derived from the dataset by Böhmelt and 
Freyburg. Compliance is operationalized based upon the EU Commission’s annual reports on 
each candidate’s progress in aligning its policies with EU requirements. The value of 0 is 
assigned when a country does not comply with the acquis in a specific issue area (34 policy 
areas are distinguished); 1 if a country partly complies with EU laws and regulations in a 
specific issue area, although substantially more efforts are necessary; 2 if a country almost 
fully complies with the acquis in a specific issue area, although more efforts are necessary; 
and 3 when a country fully complies with EU laws and regulations in a specific issue area. 
Böhmelt and Freyburg then estimated the average degree of compliance which creates their 
final compliance variable (Böhmelt and Freyburg 2012, 8).  
Religious tradition is the first correlated variable tested by Pellegrini and Gerlagh. 
They found that the share of Protestants in a state population correlates with levels of 
corruption. Hence, for this variable a country’s share of Protestants is used. The data for this 
variable is derived from the QoG Basic dataset. This is a dataset that contains variables 
related to causes, consequences and nature of Good Governance and the Quality of 
Government (QoG). This data is collected and sorted by people from the QoG Institute. Their 
data can freely be used (Teorell et all. 2012).  
The second independent variable that will be tested in this thesis is economic 
development. The indicator for economic development used by Pellegrini and Gerlagh is 
income in GDP per capita (2008, 261). As their study suggests, GDP per capita is measured in 
current US dollars, logged and lagged by one. This variable is derived from the World 
Development Indicators dataset. This dataset is also freely available and offers the most 
current and accurate global development data available, and includes national, regional and 
global estimates (World Bank 2013). 
The third correlating independent variable Pellegrini and Gerlagh tested is 
contemporary democracy. For this variable, data is used from the Polity IV  dataset. This data 
ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy). The Polity IV project constantly 
monitors regime changes in all major countries and provides annual assessments of regime 
authority characteristics and regime changes and data updates (Marshall, Monty G. and Keith 
Jaggers 2011). 
The fourth independent variable that is used is newspaper circulation. This measure is 
also derived from the World Development Indicators. Pellegrini and Gerlagh define 
newspaper circulation as daily newspapers circulation for 10 people (2008, 262). The World 
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Development indicators defines it as newspapers published at least four times a week and 
calculated as average circulation (or copies printed) per 1,000 people.  
The final variable that will be tested is government expenditure. General government 
final consumption expenditure includes all government current expenditures for purchases of 
goods and services (including compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditure 
on national defense and security, but excludes government military expenditures that are part 
of government capital formation. Also this data is derived from the World Development 
Indicators dataset. Data is in current U.S. dollars, logged and lagged by one year. (Pellegrini 
and Gerlagh 2008, 262 and Böhmelt and Freyburg 2012, 13). 
 
Data collection / case selection 
Because of the mixed methods approach I make use of both qualitative and quantitative data 
for my research. For both the statistical analysis as for the case studies I make use of various 
primary academic sources, which include several databases, books, reports and peer-reviewed 
journal articles.  
One important source that needs some further explanation is the European 
Commission’s annual regular reports. The regular reports by the Commission are drawn up 
annually since 1997. In these reports the progress of every candidate country is monitored and 
internal reforms and developments can be influenced through the ranking of the applicants. 
These reports are made public every year, so they also are part of a ‘naming and shaming’ 
strategy of the EU (De Ridder 2009, 65-66). 
The case selection for this research is quite plain. Included are the countries that are 
(former) candidate states  of the EU between 1997 and 2012. The year 1997 is chosen because 
since that year the EU started to consider the fight against corruption as a membership 
condition for candidate countries (Bulletin of the European Union 1997, 20).  The following 
countries are part of this research: Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia (joined in 2004), Bulgaria and Romania (joined 
in 2007), Croatia (acceding), Turkey, Macedonia, Montenegro (candidate countries) 
(European Union 2013). 
The temporal domain chosen for each specific candidate state coincides with data 
availability for the independent variable, that is probability, the official start of the 
enlargement monitoring process and, hence, the first regular reports on a country’s degree of 
compliance with EU law.  
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The case studies encompass five countries which have the most variation in corruption 
perceptions during the accession process. This includes Bulgaria and Latvia (their CPI scores 
increased 11 points) and Czech Republic and Poland (their CPI scores dropped 9 and 10 
points, respectively).  Finally, also Croatia is included because this is the first and only 
candidate country to join the EU in 2013. The variation in corruption levels is shown in table 
3.  
 
European Union Accession Process 
For this thesis the EU accession process needs some elaboration. The acquis communautaire 
is the central element in this process. This acquis is the collection of all legislation, legal acts 
and court decisions which constitute the EU law. This acquis is divided into 31 chapters on 
which the EU and candidate countries negotiate. In the end, the EU wants a candidate country 
to fully comply with the acquis. Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier argue there are two types 
of conditionality, one is the aforementioned acquis conditionality. The other is democratic 
conditionality (Schimmelfennning and Sedelmeier 2004, 669). Democratic conditionality 
concerns the fundamental political principles of the EU, the norms of human rights and liberal 
democracy while acquis conditionality is about the specific rules and legislation that is put up 
in the acquis communautaire (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2004, 676-677). 
The accession process starts by focusing on and establishing democratic institutions, 
that is democratic conditionality. When there is a solid democratic basis in a candidate state, 
negotiations start and the acquis conditionality gets important. During the negotiations the 
democratic conditionality is not very important anymore and recedes in the background. The 
commission does however still monitor this democratic conditionality (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2004, 677).  
The acquis conditionality is part of the negotiations process. The incentive for 
candidate states is the EU offering membership to the EU. In return the candidate state needs 
to comply with all the acquis to be allowed to become an EU member state. The main 
difference between the two different forms of conditionality is that the acquis conditionality is 
based on legislation. A legally binding agreement can be made to implement these rules and 
comply. On the other hand there is democratic conditionality, which is quite vague. There are 
no clear definitions or directions on what it means to combat corruption or for example 
creating an independent administrative system. This is also shown with regard to the acquis. It 
is fairly easy to see if compliance is reached in case of  to the acquis. In relation to the EU 
anti-corruption policy there are some elements considered important by the Commission (see 
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the section on the EU anti-corruption policy), but there are no clear directives on exactly how 
to curb corruption.  
 
Statistical Analyses 
In this section the results of the statistical analysis are provided. First the dependent and 
independent variables and their descriptive statistics are discussed.  
Table 1. Variables descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Dependent      
Corruption (CPI) 88 40.56 9.03 26 61 
Independent      
Probability 101 0.51 0.25 0 1 
Compliance 101 0.44 0.22 .11 0.80 
Newspaper 39 135.17 48.59 38.26 209.09 
GDP per capita 101 8.49 0.62 7.1 9.67 
Government expenditure 101 22.25 1.30 19.91 25.26 
Democracy 101 8.93 1.06 6 10 
Protestants 90 8.31 16.66 0 66 
 
Table 1 gives an overview of the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and all 
independent variables. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index is 
ranged from 0, the country is perceived highly corrupt, to 100, the country is perceived very 
clean. The mean of perceived corruption in the sample that is used in this thesis is 40.56, 
based on 88 observations. A few countries/observations are taken out of the sample because 
of missing values. Transparency International does not have enough data sources for some 
countries to be included in the rankings. They have a thumb rule of a minimum of three data 
sources for a country to be included. Therefore Malta and Cyprus are almost completely 
excluded from the sample regarding the dependent variable. Also Lithuania, Montenegro and 
Slovenia have one missing value because of the lack of data sources. In the sample the lowest 
CPI score is 26 and the highest CPI score is 61 on a scale of 0 to 100. Figure 1 shows a 
histogram of the CPI variable. The histogram shows that most CPI scores are below 50. This 
is in line with the worldwide trend of two-thirds of the countries (scored by Transparency 
International) score below 50 (Transparency International 2013).  
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Probability is the main independent variable that is tested in this thesis. As  mentioned 
before, this variable is coded in the same way it is done in previous research by Böhmelt and 
Freyburg. The data that is used to construct this variable is derived from the dataset used by 
Böhmelt and Freyburg. Their dataset includes  a year to year probability coding for every EU 
candidate country of the 2004 and 2007 wave and for Croatia, Turkey, Macedonia and 
Montenegro (Böhmelt and Freyburg 2012, 7).   Their data is the basis of the dataset for this 
thesis so the number of observations (101 observations) is derived from their dataset as well. 
Their range of countries and years of study are chosen in line with the availability of reports 
on degrees of compliance by the EU (Böhmelt and Freyburg 2012, 8).   Probability ranges 
from 0 to 1 as explained before in the variables section. The mean of the probability variable 
is 0.51 which corresponds to the negotiations process fairly well.  
Along with probability, compliance is included in the analysis. Although this thesis is 
about testing the dependent variable for probability, compliance is included because it might 
be that the conclusions by Böhmelt and Freyburg are not in line with this thesis’ findings. The 
findings by Böhmelt and Freyburg show a direct relation between probability and compliance. 
I have reason to believe en will explain later that this relation is not present.  Again, this data 
is derived from the dataset by Böhmelt and Freyburg as mentioned before. In this thesis 
sample the independent variables probability and compliance do indeed have a significant 
relationship (r = .77, p < .05) as seen in table 2.  
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Table 2. Correlation probability and compliance 
 Probability Compliance 
Probability 1.0000  
Compliance 0.7731 *** 1.0000 
*** p < 0.001   
 
The independent variable newspaper is derived from the article of Pellegrini and Gerlagh. 
They introduced this variable because of the claim that corruption scandals exposed by the 
media, acts as a deterrent to engage in corruption activities (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2008, 
252). The problem with this variable in my sample is the amount of observations. There are 
only 39 observations. The data for this variable is coming from UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics. This is the same source Pellegrini and Gerlagh are using. Unfortunately it does not 
provide many observations over time (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2012). The data for the 
variable newspaper consists of the number of total average circulation per 1,000 inhabitants. 
Both GDP per capita and government expenditure are based on data from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank 2013).  Both items are measured in current US dollars, 
logged and lagged by one year (Böhmelt and Freyburg 2012, 13). 
The democracy variable is used from the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2011). 
The project is the most widely used data resource for studying regime change and the effects 
of regime authority. The procedure used creates a range from +10 to -10, respectively full 
democracy to full autocracy. The mean of 8.93 and the range of 6 to 10 in the sample 
indicates that all countries are relatively democratic to full democratic.   
The final independent variable is Protestants which measures the percentage of 
Protestants in a given country. This variable is derived from the dataset from QoG institute 
(the standard dataset). As the mean of this variable shows, most countries’ amount of 
Protestants is quite low. Only because of the high amount of Protestants in Estonia (66 
percent) the mean gets around 8 percent. When Estonia would be excluded the mean of this 
variable would only be 4.18.   
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Figure 3 summarizes the patterns of the Corruption Perceptions Index scores per country over 
time. According to this figure, some countries did improve their CPI scores and some did not. 
In table 3 the starting and ending scores per accession period per country are noted and the 
difference is calculated.  A ‘+’ indicates there has been an improvement in the country’s CPI 
score over time, a ‘-’ indicates the opposite movement. Based on table 3 Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey became cleaner during the EU 
accession process. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia are 
perceived more corrupt after the accession process. For Cyprus, Malta and Romania the level 
of corruption stayed the same or there is not enough data to draw conclusions.  
  
Table 3. Starting- and ending scores per country during the EU accession process 
Country Starting CPI score Ending CPI score Difference 
Bulgaria 29 40 + 11 
Croatia 34 41 + 7 
Cyprus x 61 x 
Czech Republic  48 39 - 9 
Estonia  57 55 - 2 
Hungary 50 49 - 1 
Latvia  27 38 + 11 
Lithuania 38 47 + 9 
Macedonia 27 38 + 11 
Malta x x x 
Montenegro 33 39 + 6 
Poland  46 36 - 10 
Romania 30 30 x 
Slovakia 39 37 - 2 
Slovenia 60 59 - 1 
Turkey 34 44 + 10 
  Total countries ‘+’ N=7  
  Total countries ‘-’ N=6 
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The next part of the statistical analysis consists of an Ordinary Least Squares regression 
analysis done with STATA. The results are shown in table 4 and will be discussed below.  
Table 4. OLS Regression Analysis 
 Corruption 
Compliance 3.869 
(0.68) 
Probability  -1.483 
(0.32) 
GDP per capita 7.389 
(5.29)*** 
Expenditure lag 0.385 
(0.54) 
Democracy 2.099 
(2.56)** 
Protestants  0.286 
(6.27)*** 
Constant -52.099 
(3.27)*** 
Observations 79 
R-squared 0.64 
  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed) 
 
Overall Model fit 
The number of observations is 79. One reason the level of observations is as high as 79 is 
because the newspaper variable is dropped. According to Green (1991) a rule thumb for the 
minimum acceptable sample size is 50 + 8k, where k is the number of predictors. The amount 
of predictors in this regression analysis is 6, so the sample size needs to be around 98. 
However, when including the newspaper variable as a predictor, the number of observations 
drops to 33, which is definitely too low. The R-squared value is the proportion of variance in 
the dependent variable (corruption) which can be explained by the independent variables 
(compliance probability, GDP, expenditure, democracy and Protestants). In this thesis’ 
regression analysis the R-squared value is .64. This means that all independent variables 
(together) can account for 64 percent of the variation in levels of perceived corruption in the 
candidate countries of the sample. At the same time when using the  adjustment of the R-
squared that penalizes the addition of extraneous predictors to the model, the value remains 
high, 61 percent. Although the R-squared value is quite high, correlation does not imply 
causation.  
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Parameter estimates 
The first column in table 4 shows all predictors (independent variables): compliance, 
probability, GDP, expenditure, democracy and Protestants. The value constant is representing 
the constant or intercept. The second column shows the values for the regression equation for 
predicting the dependent variable from the independent variables. For example, for every unit 
increase in compliance, a 3.869 unit increase in corruption is predicted, holding all other 
variables constant. An ‘increase’ in the CPI equals a reduce in corruption. The numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistic for each variable. Independent variables GDP, Protestants and 
constant are statistically significant because their p-values of 0.000 are less than .01.  Variable 
democracy is statistically significant too because its p-value of 0.01 is lower than .05. 
Noteworthy is the fact that variables probability and compliance both are not statistically 
significant, nor is the variable expenditure. 
 
Table 5. OLS Regression Analysis  
 Compliance 
Probability 0.66 
(12.13) *** 
Constant 0.10 
(3.28) *** 
Observations 101 
R-squared 0.60 
  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed). 
 
To test the theory by Böhmelt and Freyburg, another OLS regression analysis is done with 
STATA. This regression analysis is pretty much the same Böhmelt and Freyburg have done in 
their research, but is necessary to perform because conclusions can only be drawn when the 
relationship between probability and compliance is proven once again. Table 5 indeed shows 
that variable probability is significant because of its p-value of 0.01. 
Two important findings emerge from both tables 4 and 5. First, the relationship 
between compliance and membership probability is indeed proven by the second regression 
analysis (table 5). Membership probability can account for 60 percent of the variation in 
levels of compliance in the candidate countries of the sample. Second, although the 
relationship between compliance and probability is proven, none of both variables are 
significant related to corruption as shown in table 4. So although countries comply with EU 
rules during the accession process corruption is not affected by the level of compliance. 
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According to this result corruption is not affected by the fact that candidate states comply nor 
by the level of EU membership probability.  
However, corruption and legislation on corruption are two different things. The 
argument cannot be made that candidate states do not comply. The only argument that can be 
made is that (overall) compliance is not related to corruption. These two things should be 
separated and some further research is required. Therefore in the next section five case studies 
will be provided. The case studies encompass five countries that had the most variation in 
corruption when comparing the beginning and the end of the accession process. This includes 
Bulgaria and Latvia (their CPI scores both increased 11 points) and the Czech Republic and 
Poland (their CPI scores dropped 9 and 10 points, respectively).  Finally, also Croatia is 
reviewed because this is the newest candidate state for which the EU influence/policy may 
differ.  
 One variable that is statistically significant in the regression analysis is the amount of 
Protestants in a country. In the case studies however there is no evidence for the amount of 
Protestants to cause corruption or that the amount of Protestants is a consequence of 
corruption. On the contrary, it can be concluded that corruption can only be predicted by the 
amount of Protestants in a country. The case studies therefore mainly focus on corruption in 
the different countries in relation to both compliance and probability. This is in addition to the 
statistical analysis and is done to further investigate how the phenomena are related and to see 
how the hypothesis works out.   
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Bulgaria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The situation when Bulgaria was recognized as a candidate state 
Bulgaria applied for membership in December 1995. The accession negotiations started in 
February 2000. This section will cover the years before and around 2000. “Corruption 
remains a serious problem in Bulgaria” (European Commission 1998, 9). This quote was 
stated in the 1998 regular report on Bulgaria’s process towards accession. Indeed corruption 
was a serious problem in Bulgaria and it still is right now. As is made clear before, taking 
anti-corruption measures was one of the membership criteria since 1997. When the 1998 
European Commission regular report came out, few things were mentioned about measures 
that already were taken. The report mentioned the fact that the government prioritized the 
issue of corruption and has taken measures to combat it. However, the report concluded that 
despite the measures that were taken, further efforts were needed to achieve the proper results 
(1998, 9). The EU Commissions report did not specify ‘serious problem’, but the 2002 
evaluation report on Bulgaria by GRECO was much more specific (GRECO 2002, 3-6).  The 
GRECO report stated that the public sector was to a large extend affected by the phenomenon 
of corruption. Survey’s around 1998 were showing that a big part of the population believed 
that corruption was widespread (GRECO 2002,4) . This was indeed in line with the CPI 
scores of 29 and 33 in 1998 and 1999. Freedom House also acknowledged high rates of 
corruption and widespread organized crime in Bulgaria (Freedom House 1998). 
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What measures were taken? 
A great number of measures were taken by the Bulgarian government to combat corruption 
and get in line with EU rules, which is to comply with EU rules. The starting point was the 
‘90s when cooperation and assistance programs helped in strengthening democratic values in 
Bulgaria (GRECO 2002, 3). In 1998 the first serious anti-corruption package was constituted 
by the government, the so-called “Integrated National Strategy on Combating crime”. The 
objectives of this strategy were to establish a uniform state policy, create a system for 
administrative control and sanctions, modernize the legal framework, establish clear rules for 
administrative services, developing coordination between all actions aimed at fighting 
corruption and to establish a register for financial and property status of public officials 
(GRECO 2002, 4). All these objectives were set and implemented by the Bulgarian 
government between 1998 and 2001. Although all these measures were taken, the European 
Commission was not satisfied and argued that more effort was needed (European Commission 
1998, 9). Additional measures  were  taken by the Bulgarian government: several amendments 
were made to the Penal Code, laws  were adopted against money laundering and an 
information system to counter crime was established, several laws were adopted and Bulgaria 
joined Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (European Commission 
1998, 9 and European Commission 1999, 13). In 2001 a new government instituted a National 
Strategy for Combating Corruption. This strategy included four main goals: setting up an 
institutional legal environment which restrains corruption, reforms in the judiciary, reforms in 
the economy and better cooperation between government, NGO’s and media (European 
Commission 2001, 19). In 2002 the EU Commission stated that the challenge was to ensure 
full implementation of the aforementioned National Strategy (2002, 26).  
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 The situation after signing the accession treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The CPI score of Bulgaria when they joined the EU in 2007 was around 40 (on a scale from 0 
– 100). This means that since Bulgaria was recognized as a candidate state by the EU, 
perceived corruption grew from 29 to 40 (it grew to a more clean country). However, unless 
this decrease of corruption, Bulgaria is still considered to be one of the worst doing countries 
regarding corruption. In 2011, the share of people who were asked for bribes in Bulgaria was 
higher than the average for the EU and in comparison with the levels registered by the 2009 
Eurobarometer survey (CSD 2012, 6-7). Striking is the effect of corruption in Bulgaria after 
the accession treaty was signed. Corruption Perceptions index scores are respectively, 41 
(2007) 36, (2008), 38 (2009), 36 (2010) and 33 (2011). Where the Bulgarian CPI starting 
point was around 30 in 1998/1999, in 2011 Bulgaria returned to that point. In 2008, after 
accession, pre-accession funds that were meant to help Bulgaria transition to full membership 
were frozen by the EU because of misuse of resources by government officials (Gawthrope 
2010, 2). This created a situation in which the relation between Bulgaria and the EU became 
more and more unstable.  
 
Role of the European Union 
The hypothesis tested in this thesis is the higher the membership probabilities of candidate 
states, the lower the levels of corruption in these states. In the case of Bulgaria I argue that 
this is indeed the case. The case of Bulgaria is a clear example of a country complying with 
EU rules where levels of corruption are changing towards a more clean country along the way 
of the accession process. As soon as Bulgaria officially joined the EU in 2007, the level of 
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corruption dropped. The effect of membership probability is highly visible. As soon as 
Bulgaria was entering the EU as a member state, that is as soon as probability was at the 
highest level, the levels of corruption started to drop. The biggest impact the EU had after 
Bulgaria joined the Union was that Bulgaria irreversibly lost 220 million Euro of pre-
accession Phare and Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) funding for 
shortcomings in judiciary reform and for failing to adequately tackle corruption and organized 
crime (Gadowska 2010, 192).  
 
Other variables causing change in corruption in Bulgaria 
The most influential factor influencing the levels of corruption in Bulgaria was the EU anti-
corruption policy and the related pressure during the accession process. This is back upped by 
the fact that the situation after the accession process got worse and Bulgaria became more 
corrupt again. The case of Bulgaria is therefore not in line with the results from the regression 
analysis where compliance and probability were found to be not statistically significant. 
 The GDP per capita did increase every year during the Bulgarian accession process. 
Between 1998 and 2005 the GDP per capita grew by 14 percent. Pellegrini and Gerlagh argue 
that richer countries can be expected to afford better institutions. Other variables that are 
correlated by income growth are for example schooling levels, access to media and 
urbanization. These correlated variables are associated with higher development levels and an 
increase in corruption awareness. Causality however may run in both directions (Pellegrini 
and Gerlagh 2008, 250). The strange thing with regards to the GDP per capita is the fact that 
after accession the GDP per capita kept on increasing while corruption got worse. This is a 
trend that is not in line with what is theoretically expected. GDP is indeed a good predictor for 
corruption in Bulgaria because corruption levels get better when GDP increase. For the years 
after accession this trend is reversed however, corruption levels get worse while GDP still 
increases. There only is a modest change in levels of democracy for Bulgaria over the years. 
The Polity IV data is measuring democratic levels of institutions. Bulgaria changed from a 
score of 8 to a 9 in 2001 and after that the democracy score stays the same. A score of 9 
equals a semi-consolidated democracy. 
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Poland 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The situation when Poland was recognized as a candidate state 
Poland applied for membership in April 1994. The accession negotiations started in March 
1998. This section will cover the years before and around 1998. “The efforts undertaken by 
the Polish authorities since the Opinion have not responded adequately in relation to the 
importance of the issue and little progress has been made on the establishment of a genuine 
anti-corruption policy” (European Commission 1998, 11). The 2002 GRECO report on 
Poland showed that corruption in Poland was growing. In 2000 the police instituted 1353 
preliminary proceedings in cases involving malfeasance in office, bribery and abuse of power. 
This figure was 47 percent higher than the one for 1992 (GRECO 2002, 4). In 2000 the 
European Commission’s regular report stated that the issue of corruption jumped up the 
political agenda, especially because of some critical reports on corruption in Poland.  
All these reports concluded that the poor managed bureaucracy, insufficient controls, a 
lack of transparency and a lack of accountability were factors that played important roles in 
the Polish environment in which corruption could flourish (European Commission 2000, 18). 
A lot of areas were corrupted: lobbying, conflict of interests, political party finance, judicial 
and prosecution bodies, subnational government, public procurement, privatization, customs 
and tax administration, concessions and licenses, and health care (Szarek-Mason 2010, 209).  
 
What measures were taken? 
The first anti-corruption measures were taken in the early ‘90s and were not related to any 
European rules or necessity to comply (Szarek-Mason 2010, 207). The European Commission 
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stated in their 1998 report that the anti-corruption strategy was based on an anti-corruption 
law made in 1992. However, this was not enough according to the Commission (European 
Commission 1999, 15). In 2001 and 2002 both the EU and the GRECO argued that there was 
a lack of a clear overall strategy. This lack of strategy created the perception that corruption 
was still widespread in Poland. Indeed, CPI figures in the years between 1998 and 2003 show 
a decline in scores of corruption (GRECO 2002, 24). In September 2002, this wanted strategy 
was indeed implemented by Poland. However, although the strategy came into place the 
effects were not satisfying. The strategy and related measures were implemented but the 
actual impact was rather limited (Szarek-Mason 2010, 212). Some measures that were 
implemented as a result of the anti-corruption strategy were: prosecution of corruption 
politicians, amendments were  made to the Act on Political Parties and the Election law 
(aimed at regulating financing of political parties) and a law was introduced on public 
disclosure of parliamentarians’ asset declarations (European Commission 2003, 17). The 
recommendations of the GRECO to Poland of 2002 had also been dealt with in a satisfactory 
manner, according to the GRECO (2004, 5).   
 
 The situation after signing the accession treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the years after officially becoming an EU member state in 2004 Poland’s CPI scores 
improved. Since 2004 the scores went in a straight line up from 35 to 55 in 2011. After 
joining the EU, Poland became a member of joined the so-called Twining Project. This 
project is aimed at monitoring and evaluating the implementation of anti-corruption measures 
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in Poland (Gadowska 2010, 191). In 2005 the second stage of implementation  of the anti-
corruption strategy was adopted by the Polish parliament (Gadowska 2010, 202). This anti-
corruption strategy had a few general purposes: preventing the appearance of corruption and 
implementation of mechanisms enabling effective countermeasure corruption; coordination of 
activities aimed at the abiding of the anti-corruption legal rules; creation of the clear and user 
friendly  citizens structures of the public administration at the measure of the open 
information society; limitation of the social tolerance for appearances of corruption through 
the increase of the degree of awareness and promotion of the appropriate patterns of behavior 
and elimination of corruption in the local government administration and among councilors 
(Gadowska 2010, 202-204). Poland, in contrast to countries like Bulgaria and Romania, after 
EU accession intensified its anti-corruption measures and legislation, the effectiveness of 
which is visible in the public opinion surveys by Transparency International (Gadowska 2010, 
207).  
 
Role of the European Union 
The hypothesis tested in this thesis is the higher the membership probabilities of candidate 
states, the lower the levels of corruption in these states. This hypothesis is found to be untrue 
in the case of Poland. The CPI scores of Poland dropped during the accession process and 
remarkably increased after the accession treaty was signed. The role of the EU anti-corruption 
policy in Poland is considered limited, the pressure by the EU functioned as a catalyst. As 
already mentioned, the first anti-corruption initiatives in Poland were put forward before the 
EU accession process began. Already in the ‘90s there was awareness in the government that 
corruption was a serious problem that needed to be tackled. The EU pressure during the 
accession process was the most important reason for Poland to introduce more and more anti-
corruption measures and legislation (Szarek-Mason 2010, 210). The introducing of the 
national anti-corruption strategy was also because of pressure of the EU. It cannot be stated 
that the accession process caused Poland to (re)form its anti-corruption policy. The EU 
pressure accelerated the many important reforms that took place in Poland. However, the 
changes would nevertheless have occurred. The problems that were indicated by the European 
Commission in the regular reports and by the GRECO were already high on Poland’s agenda 
(Szarek-Mason 2010, 213).   
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Other variables causing change in corruption in Poland 
When reviewing corruption in Poland the most influential variable that pops up is democracy. 
The problem of corruption was addressed by several political parties and members of 
parliament in Poland in the early ‘90s. A rise in awareness and the will to deal with the 
problem of corruption were already present in Poland before the EU accession process started.  
In 2002 the Polity IV democracy score for Poland became 10. This is the highest score which 
stands for a consolidated democracy. Treisman as well as Pellegrini and Gerlagh do not find 
democracy significant related to corruption  (Treisman 2000, 401 and Pellegrini and Gerlagh 
2008, 257) .  However, this thesis’ constructed democracy variable is significant related 
according to the regression analysis. The variable is derived from scores of political 
participation, openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the 
chief executive. Because of Poland’s democratic transition there arose a will to deal with 
corruption because there was a widespread belief this was a major problem that needed to be 
curbed.  
  For Poland the GDP per capita increased during the accession process by 2,9 percent. 
This trend continued after the accession process. The relation between GDP and corruption is 
exactly opposite of the case of Bulgaria. In the years during the accession process corruption 
in Poland got worse while the GDP increased and in the years after the accession process it 
was the other way around.  
 
Latvia 
The situation when Latvia was recognized as a candidate state 
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Latvia applied for membership in October 1995. The accession negotiations started in 
February 2000. This section will cover the years before and around 2000. The GRECO report 
on Latvia stated that there were problems to qualify precisely the level of corruption present 
in Latvia during the year 2001. However, the level of perceived corruption was worrying and 
showed that corruption affected customs, traffic police and judicial authorities. This presence 
of corruption can be considered the main reason for slowing down democratic and economic 
development in Latvia (GRECO 2002, 6). The government was well aware of these problems 
as was mentioned in the opinion on Latvia's Application for Membership: “the Government is 
conscious of a significant and widespread problem of corruption in the public administration. 
An anti-corruption program was established in 1993. A Law on Prevention of Corruption  has 
been in force for a year. Several cases have been brought” (European Commission 1997, 105). 
A report on Latvia by the Open Society Institute indicated that Latvia was relatively 
unaffected by administrative corruption. However, state capture was a major problem for 
Latvia during the ‘90s. Business and political interests were intertwined in Latvia more than 
in any other candidate country of the 2004 wave. In 2000 around 40 percent of Latvian firms 
indicated that their work, their business, was significant affected by the sale of parliamentary 
votes (Open Society Institute 2002, 295-296). Parties were almost entirely financed by private 
funds, placing them under control of wealthy patrons (Rusu 2010, 6).  
 
What measures were taken? 
In the first regular report by the European Commission some measures that were already 
taken by the Latvian government were stated: the establishment in September 1997 of a 
Council for the Prevention of Corruption; the adoption, in January 1998, of a national 
program of urgent short-term measures, which so far had been partly implemented; the 
adoption in March 1998 of a law on money laundering; new provisions on the protection of 
witnesses and crime victims in existing laws; the support by the EU of an anti-corruption 
project put forward by the Latvian; authorities in the framework of the EU Catch-Up Facility 
(European Commission 1998, 9). Other key measures that were taken in the years during the 
accession process were: government workshops and nation-wide conferences to formulate an 
effective Corruption Prevention Program in 1997–1999; surveys of households, business and 
officials conducted in 1998 with assistance from the World Bank; the Act on Public Access to 
Information, passed in 1998; the 2002 Act on Conflict of Interest of Public Officials; the Act 
on the Corruption Prevention Bureau, passed in April 2002; amendments to political party 
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finance regulations, passed in June 2002 (Open Society Institute 2002, 301). All these 
measures however were more or less just window dressing. In 2001 a review showed that 
more than a third of the tasks of Corruption Prevention Program had not been implemented 
and fulfilled (Rusu 2010, 17).  
 
 The situation after signing the accession treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the years after officially becoming an EU member state in 2004 Latvia’s CPI scores went 
up and down. In 2008 the level of perceived corruption grew to 50. In the years after it went 
down to 42 again (2011) and then up to 49 in 2012.  In 2002, Latvia established an 
independent anti-corruption agency called the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau 
(KNAB). However, during the first days after Latvia joined the EU, there was a big 
disagreement about who should be named the new head of the KNAB. After a while a new 
head was appointed, but only few years later he was dismissed because the agency was not 
sufficient in combating corruption. Next to this measure, other measures that had been 
achieved in the period after accession were: a criminal liability was determined for political 
parties’ ‘slush funds’; closed parliamentary votes were repealed; transparency of media 
ownership was achieved and finally opportunities  for the public to participate in decision 
making were created. According to the CPCB, in the period between January 1 2009  and 
December 31 2010, out of 32 tasks of the action plan with concrete implementation deadlines 
23 tasks had been fulfilled, 4 – fulfilled partially, 1 was being under implementation, 1 task – 
lost relevance and 3 tasks were not fulfilled (Delna 2011, 29). Things that still were not 
4
0
4
2
4
4
4
6
4
8
5
0
P
e
rc
e
iv
e
d
 C
o
rr
u
p
ti
o
n
 (
C
P
I)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Years (2004-2012)
Figure 9. Corruption in Latvia
36 
 
achieved in January 2013 are: political parties are still dependent on sponsors; deputy 
immunity still exists; there are no existing high standards for judge candidates (for the 
constitutional court) and the approach of corporate management appointments is still the same 
although  they wanted to change it (Endziņš et all. 2013).  
 
Role of the European Union 
The hypothesis tested in this thesis is the higher the membership probabilities of candidate 
states, the lower the levels of corruption in these states. For the case of Latvia this is indeed 
the case. However, the CPI scores of Latvia fluctuate a lot, especially in the years after 
accession. This is called the ‘day after accession’ syndrome by Delna, the Latvian part of 
Transparency International (Delna 2011, 28).  The role of the EU in the process of curbing 
corruption in Latvia is quite clear. A number of institutions have mentioned the EU as the 
main driving force for changes in the public administration, especially in terms of civil 
administration,  procurement and internal audit (Open Society Institute 2002, 304).  Delna 
also concludes that the most rapid development of anti-corruption tools took place prior to 
Latvia’s entry to the EU in 2004 when the EU and NATO acted as major champions of anti-
corruption reforms (Delna 2011, 28).  Johannsen and Pedersen also argue in favor of the 
argument of a big role of the EU. They argue that just prior to the final EU decision on whom 
to let in and whom to leave out, Latvia decided to establish their anti-corruption agency. At 
that time, they needed to show decisive action against rampant accusations of corruption, and 
establishing this agency was a perfect choice (Johannsen and Pedersen 2011, 342). 
 
Other variables causing change in corruption in Latvia 
 For Latvia the EU anti-corruption policy and the related pressure during the accession 
process was the most influential factor influencing the levels of corruption too. This is back 
upped by the fact that the situation after the accession process got worse and Latvia became 
more corrupt again.  The case of Latvia is also not in line with the results from the regression 
analysis where compliance and probability were found to be not statistically significant. 
 The democracy variable for Latvia has a score of 8 throughout the whole sample and 
does not seem to be of great influence  on the corruption lowering process. It seems that 
this is not the variable that influenced the levels of corruption in Latvia.  
More interesting in the case of Latvia is the variable GDP per capita. The GDP per 
capita follows almost exactly the same trend as the levels of corruption. There is a GDP 
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increase between 1998 and 2008 and then there is suddenly  a big drop in the Latvian GDP 
levels. Due to this economic crisis both the GDP and levels of corruption declined.  
  For the Latvian case there can be argued that the most influential factor indeed was the 
EU anti-corruption policy. This again is back upped by the corruption levels after the 
accession treaty was signed. The fluctuating levels of corruption in Latvia make it hard to find 
what factors are causing this change. 
Czech Republic 
The situation when the Czech Republic was recognized as a candidate state 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Czech Republic applied for membership in January 1996. The accession negotiations 
started in March 1998. This section will cover the years before and around 1998.The situation 
in the Czech Republic around 1998 was bad, like the four other countries that are reviewed in 
this thesis. In the Czech Republic corruption was also considered a serious problem 
(European Commission 1998, 9). Already in 1997, the Czech government adopted a 
resolution which was meant to curb corruption in the Czech Republic. The biggest problem of 
corruption in the Czech Republic was not unrelated bribes to government officials, “it existed 
on a national scale as a sophisticated enterprise that is parallel with public service” (Jordan 
2002, 21). This presence of corruption was causing the government to introduce measures to 
curb and prevent corruption. However, corruption remained a serious problem according to 
the GRECO rapport of 2002 (GRECO 2002, 26). Two prominent cases of corruption in the 
Czech Republic occurred at the top governance level. In 1997 the Czech Government was 
brought down as a result of financial scandals involving the senior coalition party, the Civic 
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Democratic Party and in 1999 the minister of finance had to step down because he was 
accused of fraud (De Ridder 2009, 64).  
 
What measures were taken? 
In 1999 the Program for the fight against corruption was adopted by the government. 
However, the European Commission noticed that the implementation in lots of areas was not 
satisfying (European Commission 2000, 21). Although some measures taken, opinion surveys 
showed that corruption in the Czech Republic was widespread and that corruption still 
persisted in state administration, followed by the police and intelligence services, healthcare, 
banking and the political sphere. Around 2000 the fight against corruption and economic 
crime suffered from inadequate staff, a lack of specialized training and a lack of effective 
cooperation among the law enforcement institutions involved (European Commission 2000, 
22). Therefore some new measures were adopted in 2001 and 2002: the Criminal Proceedings 
Code has been adopted with the intention of making the investigation of crimes more 
effective and increasing the capacity of the authorities to bring cases to court; specialized 
units at the High Public Prosecution Offices and the Supreme Public Prosecution Office on 
corruption and economic crime became operational; the National Criminal Office was 
created; specialized protection measures for witnesses were introduced; the police Presidium 
has been undergoing an internal reorganization and each Ministry was required to draw up its 
own anti-corruption program (European Commission 2001, 20 and European Commission 
2002, 25).  
 
The situation after signing the accession treaty 
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After accession, the Czech Republic CPI scores did not change much. The scores range 
between 42 and 52. After the accession the CPI scores actually returned to the CPI levels of 
before the accession process. An important trend down can be seen in the CPI scores in the 
years after 2008. The Czech anti-corruption Committee thinks there are two reasons that can 
be used to explain the trend. First and most probably, it is the utter formality of and not taking 
any actions to fulfill the Anti-Corruption Strategy from 2006. A second factor could be the 
lack of information about possible corrupt activities related to the highest political levels, to 
which there was no adequate reaction (Czech Republic anti-corruption Committee 2013, 17). 
In the years after 2004, the Czech government mostly tried to expand their existing anti-
corruption strategy. According to a 2007 survey of the business and political milieu, 
corruption was just as widespread in 2006 as in 2001 and evenly distributed throughout the 
Czech Republic with the exception of the capital Prague that is slightly different due to the 
higher number of government institutions (Rihackova 2010, 2). The key issue in the Czech 
Republic in the years after accession was the absence of positive role models, absence of 
strong proponents of the anti-corruption ethos and lack of faith that the political representation 
could become such proponent (Czech Republic Anti-Corruption Committee 2013, 17).  
 
Role of the European Union 
The decline of CPI scores in the Czech Republic in the years 1997-2002 can be explained by 
the ongoing privatization and the growing belief that it has been largely complemented by 
corruption. The turning point and the start of improvement of the situation can be explained 
by the accession process talks to admit the Czech Republic into the EU, which was 
accompanied by a large-scale adoption of European legislation and an overall implementation 
of a modern legislative framework (Czech Republic anti-corruption Committee 2013, 17). 
However, the role of the EU was rather limited in the case of the Czech Republic. Despite 
many political and financial incentives, perceived levels of corruption did not improve 
radically by the time the Czech Republic joined the EU (De Ridder 2009, 72). According to 
De Ridder that limited impact of the EU can be explained by two things. First, the EU was 
making the Czech Republic comply with the Copenhagen criteria more than they were 
focusing on democratic conditionality. Second, the EU demands were quite vague. De Ridder 
argues that the regular reports were mostly descriptive and no details were given by the EU on 
what steps should be taken en how these should be implemented (2009, 74). When looking at 
the hypothesis tested, for the Czech Republic this hypothesis is found to be untrue. Although 
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the Czech government complied with EU rules the corruption levels increased in the years 
during the accession period.   
 
Other variables causing change in corruption in the Czech Republic 
The impact of EU conditionality was limited as already described above. When looking at the 
other variables tested in this thesis there is actually no variable found that is very influential at 
all. One major problem is the fact that the CPI scores went down till 2002, after that the rose 
till 2007 and then there was a big downfall again. This trend in CPI scores cannot be logically 
explained by the variables used in this thesis. The rise till 2002 is probably influenced by the 
accession process as De Ridder already pointed out. However, the impact was not that big. 
Then there is a downfall which is caused by not fulfilling the anti-corruption strategy and 
some corruption scandals in the highest political level. Both factors democracy and GDP 
seem not to have much of an impact on the levels of corruption in the Czech Republic. The 
corruption levels can most likely be explained by other variables that are not tested in this 
thesis.   
 
Croatia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The situation when Croatia was recognized as a candidate state 
Croatia applied for EU membership in 2003 and was in negotiations from 2005 until 2011. 
This section will cover the years before and around 2005. In the opinion report on Croatia’s 
application by the European Commission was stated that “international reports and surveys 
indicate that corruption in Croatia continues to be a problem and affects various aspects of 
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society” (European Commission 2004, 19). The Commission noted that various measures and 
even an anti-corruption strategy existed but there was a lack implementation of all these 
measures.  In the first regular report by the Commission it also warned that Croatia was one of 
the few European countries where the perceived corruption was actually increasing  
(European Commission 2005, 16). In 2002 a national anti-corruption strategy was developed 
and adopted. This strategy focused on 8 specific areas: the rule of law and efficiency of the 
state based on the rule of law; establishment of a special body for an efficient combat against 
corruption; increasing the efficiency of criminal prosecution of corruption; organizational 
measures in the system of governance; decentralization; financial accountability measures and 
other economic measures; international activities; encouraging political and civil 
responsibility (Budak 2006, 55). In 2004, just before the accession process started, the 
European Commission urged Croatia to improve the fight against corruption. A legal 
framework should be implemented; a national strategy for prevention and combating 
corruption should be created; and awareness of corruption as a serious crime should be raised 
(European Commission 2004).  
 
What measures were taken? 
In 2007, the European Commission argued in their regular report  that there were some results 
appearing in the fight against corruption in Croatia (European Commission 2007, 10). There 
was an anti-corruption program implemented and the Croatian legal framework has been 
improved. The implementation of these programs has resulted both in an increase in middle 
and high level corruption cases being prosecuted by law enforcement authorities as well as an 
increase in public awareness on danger and harmfulness of corruption and on the need for the 
suppression of the corruption  (Croatian Parliament 2008, 1). However, as always, the 
European Commission argued that everything that was being done fighting corruption was 
insufficient: the police was ineffective, there was a lack of coordination and there was no non-
partisan monitoring system (European Commission 2008, 9). However, in the years 2008-
2012 the European Commission began to report more positive on the subject of corruption 
and in their latest 2013 monitoring report they stated that there was an adequate legal and 
institutional framework in place for the fight against corruption and organized crime and a 
track record of implementation continues to be developed (European Commission 2013, 35). 
In 2009 the Croatian government renewed the existing anti-corruption strategy and action 
plan, thereby creating a full anti-corruption package.  
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Role of the European Union 
Croatia fulfilled all the requirements that were set by the European Commission. That is the 
reason that Croatia is able to join the EU in July 2013. However, in a recent survey 
(December 2012) by Ernst & Young 95 percent of Croatian businessmen answered that 
corruption and bribery was usual practice in business. The CPI scores of Croatia are still quite 
high, although there is a clear decrease of corruption during the accession process. Croatia can 
be argued to have complied with all EU rules. Especially  in the case of Croatia, the EU 
wanted them to comply with all rules before the accession date was set by the EU. One 
element of the process that was different from the 2004 and  2007 candidate countries was the 
Stabilisation and Association Process. This process is based on agreements, which helps each 
country to progress towards the requirements of EU membership. These agreements are the 
first step towards achieving a candidate status, and the EU sees them as a chief instrument to 
ensure reforms (Szarek-Mason 2010, 239). As for the hypothesis, Croatia complied with the 
EU rules. Not complying meant not becoming a member, the European Commission was clear 
on that. Corruption did indeed get lower during the accession process. However, it is too early 
to draw conclusions on EU influence in this matter.  
 
Other variables causing change in corruption in Croatia 
As already mentioned no early conclusions can and should be drawn. One thing that is present 
in Croatia is the political will to enter the EU. This political will resulted in compliance to EU 
rules on many areas, especially corruption. One thing that increased next to the political will 
is the Croatian Polity IV democracy score. In 2005 the score increased from 8 to 9, which 
equals a semi-consolidated democracy.  This is similar to what happened in Poland where 
democratic transition leads to a will to deal with corruption because there arose a widespread 
belief that corruption was a major problem that needed to be tackled. With regard to GDP per 
capita there can be argued that the GDP per capita increased over the years between 2003 and 
2011 (however there was a small fallback between 2008 and 2009). 
 
Main findings  
Several findings emerge from the five case studies of this thesis. They will be elaborated on in 
this section.  
The main finding is that there is no way in which we can lump all 2004 and 2007 
candidate countries together when talking about EU influence. In some countries the EU 
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influence was huge, causing domestic reforms and policy change. Other countries were 
already reforming and the EU just functioned as a catalyst, a motor to speed up the process.  
Clearly, there are two different elements of the EU anti-corruption policy. The 
difference between the two is easily recognized when reading the European Commission’s 
regular reports on each candidate state. The first element consists of the so-called democratic 
conditionality. This is a quite vague element of the anti-corruption policy. Actually this 
element is not described somewhere at all. In almost all regulars report the European 
Commission urges the candidate states to improve, strengthen or further develop the anti-
corruption policy. However, nowhere in the regular reports (or in any other place) does the 
European Commission mention what exactly needs to be done and how it should be achieved. 
Therefore the candidate states did not know what to do to fully comply with the European 
commands. This vagueness is the main reason for many scholars to argue for a new, clear 
anti-corruption policy by the European Commission (De Ridder 2009, 73).  
The other element consists of the acquis communautaire. In the case studies is shown 
that pretty much all elements are implemented by the candidate states. This element of the 
acquis consists of legislation and law. For example, the rules that should be complied to were 
used to criminalize organized crime, fraud.  Part of the negotiation process was that the EU 
wanted candidate states to accede to existing anti-corruption conventions. There are 
conventions on corruption, bribery, money laundering et cetera. This part of the acquis (the 
legislation and the accession to existing conventions) was not something the candidate states 
could negotiate about. These actions simply needed to be completed before a candidate state 
could become a member (De Ridder 2009, 73).  
Another conclusion based on the case studies is the fact that the EU did not take into 
account the fact that implementing the acquis, that is implementing anti-corruption measures, 
would not necessarily lead to less corruption. The relationship between legislation or even a 
package of anti-corruption measures, a so-called anti-corruption strategy, and how people 
perceive corruption is never tested. The goal of the European Commission was formal 
compliance rather than active implementation. For example, even though the Commission 
knew about the problems with the actual implementation of the anti-corruption reforms in 
Poland, it intentionally did not see the lack of progress and it tended to focus only on what 
had been accomplished (Szarek-Mason 2010, 213). 
Another thing that has been proven by the case studies, as well as the statistical 
analysis, is the fact that both studies of Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier and Böhmelt and 
Freyburg are found to be right. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier distinguish between 
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democratic conditionality and acquis conditionality and argue that for democratic 
conditionality effectiveness depends purely on initial conditions in candidate states. Acquis 
conditionality however can be explained by the credibility of the EU. Credibility that the EU 
will reward compliance to EU rules with membership (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 
2004, 679 and Böhmelt and Freyburg 2012, 18). 
The overall conclusion, based on both the statistical analysis and the case studies 
combined,  is that the scope for the EU to influence corruption in candidate states remains 
limited when there are no national actors who cooperate. The Commission provides accession 
countries with financial and technical assistance, but while the EU can provide the tools and 
political incentives to bring about change, these are of no use unless they are taken up by 
national leaders. The European Commission did not make any strong demands regarding the 
fight against corruption. De Ridder argues this is because there does exists no competence for 
this policy inside the Union itself (2009, 78). Because of the vague demands and vague 
regular reports the fight against corruption in the candidate countries was mainly established 
by policies on the national level. 
 
Conclusions 
This thesis goal was to assess to what extent the EU anti-corruption policy of the EU 
accession process reduces corruption in candidate states? The answer to this question is 
twofold. First, when looking at the acquis communautaire rules regarding corruption  the role 
of the EU is a large one. Based on the regular reports it can be argued that pretty much all 
legislation, laws, rules and conventions part of the anti-corruption policy of the EU are 
implemented by the (former) candidate states. There is no doubt this is quite an achievement 
of the EU and based on this results the job is well done. However, the other answer to this 
thesis’ question is that the democratic conditionality has not worked out as well as the EU 
hoped for. The role of the EU regarding the fight of corruption in candidate states was 
therefore rather limited. 
In this thesis the first part of answering the research question consisted of a statistical 
analysis. In this thesis the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International is used 
as an indicator to obtain levels of perceived corruption in various countries. The reason for 
choosing this index is because it is the currently most used index with regard to perceived 
corruption. The main independent variable that was tested in this thesis is EU membership 
probability. Probability ranges from 0 to 1 as explained before in the variables section. The 
mean of this variable in the sample is 0.51 which corresponds to the negotiations process 
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fairly well. Next to compliance, the other explanatory variables that are used in the analysis 
are derived from the work of Pellegrini and Gerlagh: GDP, expenditure, democracy and 
Protestants.   
The main findings of the regression analysis are that all independent variables 
(together) can account for 64 percent of the variation in levels of perceived corruption in the 
candidate countries of the sample. Independent variables GDP, Protestants and constant are 
statistically significant because their p-values of 0.000 are less than .01. Variable democracy 
is also statistically significant because its p-value of 0.01 is lower than .05. Noteworthy is the 
fact that variables probability and compliance are both not statistically significant, neither is 
the variable expenditure.  
The second regression analysis is done to prove the relationship between probability 
and compliance. Membership probability can account for 60 percent of the variation in levels 
of compliance in the candidate countries of the sample and is statistically significant because 
its p-value of 0.01. 
The main conclusion drawn from the analysis is that although countries comply with 
EU rules during the accession process, corruption in those candidate states is not affected by 
the level of compliance. According to this result the levels of corruption are not affected by 
the fact that candidate states comply nor by the level of EU membership probability. 
In the second part of the thesis five case studies were done to further understand the 
causal mechanisms linking anti-corruption policy and corruption. The main findings that 
emerged from the case studies are: there is no way in which we can lump all 2004 and 2007 
candidate countries together when talking about EU influence; there is a need to distinguish 
between the two different elements of the EU anti-corruption policy (democratic 
conditionality and acquis conditionality); the EU has not thought of the possibility that 
implementing anti-corruption measures would not necessarily lead to less corruption and  
finally the scope for the EU to influence corruption in candidate states remains limited when 
there are no national actors who cooperate. 
 Another important thing to notice is the fact that none of all the countries dealt with in 
the case studies have a higher CPI score than 61 after signing the accession treaty, which is 
below the EU average of 63.6.  
 
Generalizability 
Case study research is often criticized for the limited number of investigated cases which is 
said to limit the generalization of the findings (external validity). However, because of the 
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mixed research design the generalizability of this thesis is high. Both elements, the statistical 
part and the case studies complement each other in their findings and therefore the arguments 
that are made are generalizable. The conclusions done based upon the case studies however 
are only on the five countries that were observed. The case studies have not shown  or proven 
the relationship between variables tested in the statistical analysis, they are not meant to do so.  
 
Limitations 
Two alternative models that are explored by Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier are the social 
learning model and the lesson-drawing model. The social learning model follows core tenets 
of social constructivism. This model assumes the logic of appropriateness. Actors are 
motivated  by internalized identities, values and norms.  The general proposition of the social 
learning model is therefore that a state adopts EU rules if it is persuaded of the 
appropriateness of EU rules (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2004, 676). The lesson-
drawing model argues EU rule adaption is a response to domestic dissatisfaction. The most 
general proposition of the lesson-drawing model is: a state adopts EU rules, if it expects these 
rules to solve domestic policy problems effectively (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2004, 
676). These alternative models are not tested or evaluated in this thesis.  
With regard to the External Incentives Model, I only checked  the ‘speed and size of 
rewards’ aspect of the model. While Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier argue the cost-benefit 
balance depends on four factors, I have looked at only one element. Although ‘speed and size 
of rewards’ seems to be the most influential factor, there is no room to examine the other 
three factors.  One conclusion however is that Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier are right in 
distinguishing between democratic conditionality and acquis conditionality. They argue that 
for democratic conditionality effectiveness depends purely on initial conditions in candidate 
states. Acquis conditionality however can be explained by the credibility of the EU. 
Credibility that the EU will reward compliance to EU rules with membership 
(Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2004, 679 and Böhmelt and Freyburg 2012, 18). 
 Another limitation is due the fact that there are only seven explanatory variables used 
in this thesis. These are most likely not all of the variables that influence the levels of 
corruption in a certain country.  
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Future and recommendations  
If the EU wants future candidate states to lower corruption, work on an EU anti-corruption 
policy is needed. When regarding the acquis communautaire (acquis conditionality), there is 
no need to change. However the EU should question if  compliance to these formal 
regulation/EU rules will lead to the effect they have in mind. Second, the EU should change 
their democratic conditionality. The EU did not make any strong demands during the 
accession of  2004 and 2007. A little more demands were made when Croatia entered the 
accession process, however these demands were still not based on a clear EU anti-corruption 
policy. This vagueness and lack of direction is causing the limited influence of the EU on the 
fight against corruption in candidate countries.  
Another important factor is the lack of a solid and clear anti-corruption policy for 
existing member states.  Although for member states conditionality does not play any role, 
there exists no competence for this policy inside the Union itself. If there is no anti-corruption 
policy for the members of the EU, how should candidate states know what to do to comply to 
the EU demands on corruption? 
Therefore my recommendation is that a clear-cut EU anti-corruption policy is needed 
for member states as well as for candidate states. Through conditionality the EU can lay down 
this new policy in candidate states for them to implement.  
 
Conditionality through clear-cut policy.  
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